Principal Doctrines Epicurus
The "Principal Doctrines" (also sometimes translated under the
title "Sovran Maxims") are a collection of forty quotes from
the writings of Epicurus that serve as a handy summary of his
ethical theory:
1. A blessed and indestructible being has no trouble himself
and brings no trouble upon any other being; so he is free from
anger and partiality, for all such things imply weakness.
2. Death is nothing to us; for that which has been dissolved
into its elements experiences no sensations, and that which has
no sensation is nothing to us.
3. The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal
of all pain. When such pleasure is present, so long as it is
uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of
both together.
4. Continuous bodily pain does not last long; instead, pain,
if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree
of pain which slightly exceeds bodily pleasure does not last for
many days at once. Diseases of long duration allow an excess of
bodily pleasure over pain.
5. It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely
and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely
and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever
any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is
not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly,
it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.
6. In order to obtain protection from other men, any means for
attaining this end is a natural good.
7. Some men want fame and status, thinking that they would thus
make themselves secure against other men. If the life of such
men really were secure, they have attained a natural good; if,
however, it is insecure, they have not attained the end which
by nature's own prompting they originally sought.
8. No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but the things which
produce certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater
than the pleasures themselves.
9. If every pleasure had been capable of accumulation, not only
over time but also over the entire body or at least over the
principal parts of our nature, then pleasures would never differ
from one another.
10. If the things that produce the pleasures of profligate men
really freed them from fears of the mind concerning celestial and
atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, and the fear of pain;
if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should
never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would
then be filled with pleasures from every source and would never
have pain of body or mind, which is what is bad.
11. If we had never been troubled by celestial and atmospheric
phenomena, nor by fears about death, nor by our ignorance of
the limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need of
natural science.
12. It is impossible for someone to dispel his fears about the
most important matters if he doesn't know the nature of the
universe but still gives some credence to myths. So without the
study of nature there is no enjoyment of pure pleasure.
13. There is no advantage to obtaining protection from other men
so long as we are alarmed by events above or below the earth or
in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe.
14. Protection from other men, secured to some extent by the
power to expel and by material prosperity, in its purest form
comes from a quiet life withdrawn from the multitude.
15. The wealth required by nature is limited and is easy to
procure; but the wealth required by vain ideals extends to
infinity.
16. Chance seldom interferes with the wise man; his greatest
and highest interests have been, are, and will be, directed by
reason throughout his whole life.
17. The just man is most free from disturbance, while the unjust
is full of the utmost disturbance.
18. Bodily pleasure does not increase when the pain of want has
been removed; after that it only admits of variation. The limit
of mental pleasure, however, is reached when we reflect on these
bodily pleasures and their related emotions, which used to cause
the mind the greatest alarms.
19. Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of
pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason.
20. The flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to
provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, intellectually
grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing
the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life,
and we have no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless
the mind does not shun pleasure, and even when circumstances make
death imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life.
21. He who understands the limits of life knows that it is easy
to obtain that which removes the pain of want and makes the
whole of life complete and perfect. Thus he has no longer any
need of things which involve struggle.
22. We must consider both the ultimate end and all clear sensory
evidence, to which we refer our opinions; for otherwise everything
will be full of uncertainty and confusion.
23. If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no
standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even
those sensations which you claim are false.
24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping
to distinguish between opinion about things awaiting confirmation
and that which is already confirmed to be present, whether in
sensation or in feelings or in any application of intellect to
the presentations, you will confuse the rest of your sensations
by your groundless opinion and so you will reject every standard
of truth. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm
as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does
not, you will not avoid error, as you will be maintaining the
entire basis for doubt in every judgment between correct and
incorrect opinion.
25. If you do not on every occasion refer each of your actions
to the ultimate end prescribed by nature, but instead of this
in the act of choice or avoidance turn to some other end, your
actions will not be consistent with your theories.
26. All desires that do not lead to pain when they remain
unsatisfied are unnecessary, but the desire is easily got rid
of, when the thing desired is difficult to obtain or the desires
seem likely to produce harm.
27. Of all the means which wisdom acquires to ensure happiness
throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is
friendship.
28. The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing
we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables
us to see that in the limited evils of this life nothing enhances
our security so much as friendship.
29. Of our desires some are natural and necessary, others are
natural but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor
necessary, but are due to groundless opinion.
30. Those natural desires which entail no pain when unsatisfied,
though pursued with an intense effort, are also due to groundless
opinion; and it is not because of their own nature they are not
got rid of but because of man's groundless opinions.
31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent
one man from harming or being harmed by another.
32. Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements
with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either
justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either
could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict
nor suffer harm.
33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only
agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places
at various times providing against the infliction or suffering
of harm.
34. Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence
of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being
discovered by those appointed to punish such actions.
35. It is impossible for a man who secretly violates the terms
of the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel confident that
he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten
thousand times; for until his death he is never sure that he
will not be detected.
36. In general justice is the same for all, for it is
something found mutually beneficial in men's dealings, but in
its application to particular places or other circumstances the
same thing is not necessarily just for everyone.
37. Among the things held to be just by law, whatever is proved
to be of advantage in men's dealings has the stamp of justice,
whether or not it be the same for all; but if a man makes a law
and it does not prove to be mutually advantageous, then this is no
longer just. And if what is mutually advantageous varies and only
for a time corresponds to our concept of justice, nevertheless
for that time it is just for those who do not trouble themselves
about empty words, but look simply at the facts.
38. Where without any change in circumstances the things held
to be just by law are seen not to correspond with the concept
of justice in actual practice, such laws are not really just;
but wherever the laws have ceased to be advantageous because of
a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for that
time just when they were advantageous for the mutual dealings
of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they
were no longer advantageous.
39. The man who best knows how to meet external threats makes
into one family all the creatures he can; and those he can not,
he at any rate does not treat as aliens; and where he finds
even this impossible, he avoids all dealings, and, so far as is
advantageous, excludes them from his life.
40. Those who possess the power to defend themselves against
threats by their neighbors, being thus in possession of the
surest guarantee of security, live the most pleasant life with
one another; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy is such
that if one of them dies prematurely, the others do not lament
his death as though it called for pity.